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Margulies: First Amendment

FREE SPEECH: THE STATUS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Now we turn to the First Amendment. There were some
immensely interesting cases and to discuss those cases we have a
very distinguished authority on the First Amendment, Professor
Margulies, who is currently teaching at Quinnipiac Law School;
that is the former Bridgeport Law School. He, prior to that, had
taught at Western New England Law School, and prior to that, I
guess at the beginning, North Dakota Law School. He is, I suppose
these things always require mentioning, a graduate of Harvard Law
School. He has been a litigator for the Connecticut Civil Liberties
Union in numerous cases and has written numerous articles on
civil liberties and the First Amendment. He has also been a
member of the American Civil Liberties Union's Board of
Directors since 1988. It is my pleasure to introduce Professor
Margulies.
ProfessorMartin B. Margulies*:

INTRODUCTION

I wish, for self-serving reasons, that instead of describing me as a
distinguished speaker, Judge Lazer had described me as a second
choice, a last-minute fill-in for Burt Neuborne, because that way I
would not have to live up to a glowing introduction. But I am
going to try.
The United States Supreme Court decided six First Amendment
cases this past Term: five dealing with speech, and one dealing
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with religion. There was City of Ladue v. Gilleo,1 which held that
the government cannot prevent me from displaying noncommercial signs on my own residential property. 2 There was
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission,3 which held that an Act of Congress, requiring cable
television operators to carry a specified percentage of local
broadcasting stations, is content-neutral and therefore need not
satisfy strict scrutiny. 4 There was Waters v. Churchill,5 which
stated that when a government employer discharges or disciplines
an employee for her speech, it had better use reasonable procedures
to find out what she actually said. 6 Waters was decided by a fourmember plurality, but since two dissenting Justices advocated even
tougher, that is, more speech-protective standards, 7 the plurality
opinion plainly sets forth the minimum standards which the
8
government must satisfy.
In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation,9 the Court declared that government licensing agencies
may not discipline professionals for potentially misleading
commercial speech unless they can prove that the speech is
harmful. 10 They cannot rely on speculation; they cannot rely on
broad prophylactic rules.II In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc.,12 the Court held that a content-neutral, speech-restrictive
injunction is not a prior restraint, and is therefore subject to a lower

* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. A.B. 1961,
Columbia University; LL.B. 1954, Harvard University; LL.M. 1966, New York
University.
1. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
2. Id.at 2046-07.
3. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
4. Id. at 2469.
5. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
6. Id. at 1889.
7. Id.at 1899-1900 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
8. Id. at 1886.
9. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
10. Id. at 2086.
11. Id.at 2090.
12. 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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standard of review. 13 Madsen also held, however, that the
standard's means component is more rigorous than for time, place,
and manner regulations. 14 In plain English, this says that if judges,
by injunction, can limit the speech rights of abortion protesters
(and according to Madsen they can), then state or local legislatures
can do so afortiori,as long as they construct an adequate record. 15
Finally, Board of Education of Kityas Joel Village School District

v. Grumet1 6 concluded that the government may not create a
separate school district for Orthodox Jews, when the sole purpose
for doing so is to accommodate the religious practices of
17
handicapped Jewish children and their families.

I am not going to summarize further what each decision said, or
what this or that Justice said. You have the cases in your printed
materials. My mandate, my brief, today was to discuss trends, and
that is what I propose to do.

13. Id. at 2524 & n.2 "Here petitioners are not prevented from expressing
their message in any one of several different ways; they are simply prohibited
from expressing it within the 36-foot buffer zone. Moreover, the injunction was
issued not because of the content of petitioners' expression.., but because of
their prior unlawful conduct." Id. at 2524 n.2.
14. Id. at 2525.
15. But on later reflection, perhaps not. Madsen offered two reasons for
giving higher scrutiny to injunctions against abortion protesters. One was that
injunctions by definition target discrete individuals or groups, and thus create a
greater risk of censorship than regulations, which by definition apply throughout
society; the other was that regulations, unlike injunctions, reflect democratic
policy choices, and therefore command more deference. Id at 2524. What
happens, then, when a legislature passes a speech-restrictive regulation which though it is not overtly based on the content of expression - applies only to
protests taking place outside abortion clinics? Should courts use the lower time,
place and manner standard, on the ground that the regulation reflects a
democratic policy choice? Or should it use the higher Madsen standard, on the
ground that the regulation, being targeted, creates a risk of censorship? This
issue is being tested right now before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Sabelko v. City of Phoenix, No. 94-15495 (9th Cir. filed Mar.
22, 1994).
16. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
17. Id. at 2484.
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I. SPEECH, PROPERTY, AND POWER
I am going to begin in an unusual way. I am going to tell you
what I would have said if I had given this talk a year or two ago. I
would have said what I am sure Joel Gora and Burt Neuborne have
been telling you, because I have heard them say it on other
occasions. 18 What I would have said, therefore, would have been
something along the following lines.
When I went to law school, I learned that speech enjoyed a
"preferred position" 19 in relation to other individual rights and
government interests. When I went to law school I also learned that
speech was a mechanism whereby people who lack power and
property could acquire both.
Beginning, however, in the 1970s, and culminating with
InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,20 the 1992
airport speech case, a barebones but nevertheless clear United
States Supreme Court majority began to take a very different view
of speech. Speech was no longer a preferred right; property was.
The Justices did not exactly say that, but I am talking about what
they did. Thus, there were no speech rights on other people's
private property, even large commercial shopping centers, except
for privately owned company towns, which no longer exist.2 1
There were no speech rights on government property, except for
municipal streets, sidewalks, and parks, where nobody goes
anymore except to mug or be mugged, as Justice Kennedy pointed
out in his separate opinion in Krishna Consciousness.22 (The
Second Circuit recently reminded me of that, Judge Pratt, in Longo
v. UnitedStates Postal Service,23 which I lost two years ago.) And

18. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen and Joel Gora, Free Speech, Property, and
the Burger Court: Old Values, New Balances, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 195 (1982).
19. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
21. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (shopping centers); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company towns).
22. Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2717 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
23. 953 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993)
(discussing whether post office interior sidewalks connecting post office parking
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even on municipal streets, sidewalks, and parks where people do
have speech rights because streets, sidewalks, and parks, historically, have been held "in trust" for the public (another interesting
property metaphor) the government is free to impose substantial
burdens on those speech rights, in the name of aesthetics, economy
or efficiency, by enacting content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulations. These regulations, in the 'eighties, were subject to a
24
very low standard of review, in practice if not in theory.
There was only one category of speech that the United States
Supreme Court protected with vigor and rigor. That was the right
to use one's own property for speech purposes. The poor as well as
the rich had the indefeasible right, therefore, to advertise in the
New York Times or on prime time television, or to buy their own
newspapers or television channels and advertise or editorialize
there. The poor as well as the rich had the right to conduct mass
mailings. And furthermore, when poor people did these things they
had the indefeasible right to say anything they wanted - to
advocate communism, socialism, syndicalism, or whatever because the government was constitutionally required to treat all
5
viewpoints the same.2
But in practice, of course, this approach was anything but
viewpoint neutral, because people who own or have access to these
kinds of property do not ordinarily use the property to bash or
challenge the system. The people who would have challenged the
system were, in contrast, effectively silenced because they had no
property with which to speak. In consequence, the marketplace of
ideas was badly distorted in favor of the status quo. But this, to that
barebones Supreme Court majority, was simply an example of a
lots with entrances to the post office building were public forums for First

Amendment purposes).
24. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) ("[A]

regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly
tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but.., it
need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so."); see also
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Members
of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
25. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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constitutionally irrelevant unintended discriminatory impact. Put
differently: by 1992, speech was no longer a way for the
unpropertied and disempowered to acquire property and power.
Instead, first you needed property, power, or both in order to speak.
Well, things may be changing. And the harbingers of change
appeared this past Term in the unlikeliest of places. Let me begin
with Ladue.
II. RESIDENTIAL SIGNS AND AFFORDABLE SPEECH
Now, Ladue at first glance appears to be in the classic mold.
Unanimously, the Supreme Court stated that the government may
not prohibit me from using my own residential property to speak
through the medium of signs, even when the prohibition is entirely
content-neutral. 26 Ladue even goes out of its way to say that
speakers who use their own property are less likely to threaten
important countervailing government interests, such as aesthetics,
than speakers who use public property, because of their incentive
27
to keep up their property values.
So then, why do I say that Ladue is a harbinger of change? Well,
look at the reasons that Justice Stevens gave in his opinion for the
Court. The first reason was unexceptional enough. He pointed out
that residential signs are a venerable and traditional medium of
expression. 2 8 I suspect that this was a gesture to the ScaliaThomas-Rehnquist bloc, and it worked. But then he said something
else, and this was amazing. He noted that residential signs
provided a uniquely cheap, convenient and effective speech
mechanism for people of modest means; that indeed these signs
often supplied, practically speaking, the only available speech
mechanisms for such people. 2 9 Now, maybe my memory is failing,
but I do not recall seeing language like that in a United States
Supreme Court opinion since the Court said, more than fifty years

26.
27.
28.
29.

City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994).
Id. at 2047.
Id at 2045.
Id. at 2046.
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ago in Martin v. Struthers,30 that door-to-door solicitation is
essential to the poorly financed causes of little people. 3 1 Justice
Stevens' statement was an extraordinary acknowledgment, from
the modem Court, of the practical impact of private sector wealth
disparities on the effective exercise of speech rights even under
32
content-neutral rules.
III. COMMERCIAL SPEECH

A. A BriefHistoqy
Now, the next harbinger of change: Ibanez, the commercial
speech decision, written by Justice Ginsburg. Here again we have
to do some broken field running, because Ibanez does not at first
glance seem the departure I believe it to be. But it is.
To explain why, I will interject a description of how the
commercial speech elevator has fluctuated, risen and fallen, over
the past half century. Originally, of course, commercial speech
enjoyed no protection at all.33 Then, in the mid-'seventies, all of a
sudden the elevator rose, and commercial speech commanded a
very high level of protection. This occurred in Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council.34 But then, the elevator
began to drop to intermediate review in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission35 in 1980. And in the
late 'eighties, the elevator plummeted further in Board of Regents
of State University of New York v. Fox3 6 and Posadas de Puerto
Rico Associates v. Tourism Company,37 where the Court continued
to announce an intermediate review standard but applied, in
30. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
31. Id. at 146.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ladue, 114 S. Ct. at 2046.
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
492 U.S. 469 (1989).
478 U.S. 328 (1986).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1995], Art. 7

TOURO LAW REVIEW

348

[Vol I11

practice, something closer to rational basis scrutiny. 38 As I tell my
students, when you are trying to figure out what the Justices are up
to, do not just watch what they say, watch what they do.
Only last year, though, in Edenfield v. Fane39 and City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,40 the elevator began to rise
again. And finally, in Ibanez, it appears to have anchored, at least
for the time being, at the intermediate level, and a pretty rigorous
41
intermediate level at that.
B. More Recently
Now, why do I say that Ibanez implicitly promotes the speech
rights of poor people? After all, Ms. Ibanez herself was a business
person, a lawyer who happened also to be an accountant, who was
using her own property, specifically, business cards, to advertise
42
her own services, which, of course, are also her own property.
But things are not as they seem. Ibanez does promote the speech
rights of poor people. It does so in two ways.
First, and perhaps less importantly, what sorts of business people
benefit most from relatively unfettered commercial speech? It is
the outsiders, the small fry, who are trying to break into the market.
Number two, and more importantly, there is an inevitable and
close relationship between the commercial speech standard of
review and the standard of review for content-neutral time, place,
38. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 ("[W]e have not gone so far as to impose
upon... [the State] the burden of demonstrating that.., the manner of
restriction is absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired end.");
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-46 ("[T]he greater power to completely ban casino
gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino

gambling....").
39. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
40. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).

41. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 114 S.
Ct. 2084, 2086 (1994). By requiring evidence that forbidden commercial speech
is harmful, Ibanez, for instance, may undermine older decisions that sustained,
deferentially and almost casually, zoning regulations allowing on-site but not
off-site commercial advertising. See National Advertising Co. v. Town of
Niagara, 942 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991); Bums v. Barrett, 515 A.2d 1378 (Conn.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 563 (1989).
42. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct at 2086.
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and manner regulations of speech in a public forum. Indeed, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that relationship five years ago
when it diluted the standard for both in Fox and in Ward v. Rock
Against Racism.43 The relationship is simply this. Both standards,
the commercial speech standard and the time, place, and manner
standard, profess to apply intermediate scrutiny. The language is
different but the substance is the same.
This means that, if the United States Supreme Court dilutes the
intermediate standard of scrutiny when dealing with time, place,
and manner regulations, as it did in Ward,4 4 there is going to be an
inevitable spillover into the commercial speech standard. And lo
and behold there was, because that same year, 1989, Fox followed
Ward in very short order and diluted the commercial speech
standard in the very same manner: that is, by rejecting the "least
restrictive alternative" analysis of the means component. 45 And it
46
cited Ward when doing so.
Conversely, therefore, when the Court beefs up the commercial
speech standard, as it did in Ibanez, there is going to be an
inevitable impact on the time, place, and manner standard. And
again, lo and behold, there has been, because now we come to
Turner, the cablevision case.
IV. A STRONGER STANDARD OF REVIEW: NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH
In Turner, remember, the Court found Congress' "must carry"
cable requirements content-neutral, or apparently contentneutral. 4 7 Five of the nine Justices then voted to remand for further
fact-findings on two issues. 48 One of the issues need not concern
us; that was whether the regulations were truly as content-neutral
43. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).

44.
45.
(1989).
46.
47.

Id. at 797-99.
Board of Regents of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476-81

Id at 478.
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994).
48. Id. at 2472.
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as they appeared to be. 49 But the second issue was very significant;
it was whether the regulations, if they were indeed content-neutral,
satisfied the standard of review for content-neutral regulations of
non-commercial speech. 50 The lower court, relying on cases like
Ward and Vincent, had applied a fairly deferential standard. 5 1 That
standard, according to the Supreme Court in Turner, was not
vigorous enough. 52 Instead, said the Court, the government on
remand would have to make a very powerful showing, one, that the
harms which the regulations were designed to prevent were real,
not merely conjectural; two, that the regulations would actually be
effective in remediating those harms; and three, that the regulations
were not substantially more speech-burdensome than they had to
be in order to remediate those harms. 53 And, guess what? In
announcing this invigorated intermediate review standard for
content-neutral regulations of non-commercial speech, the Turner
Court cited Edenfield, the commercial speech decision that had
come down the previous year. 54 The relationship is clear.
Now, again, some broken-field running. The immediate beneficiaries of the invigorated speech standards, in Turner, are cable
companies - fat cats using their own property. How will these
standards promote the speech rights of the poor? Simple: the
standard announced in Turner is also going to be the standard for
reviewing content-neutral regulations of the time, place, and
manner of political speech in public forums.
Now, content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations of
political speech in public forums can be very burdensome indeed,
and in a twofold sense. One, these regulations can increase the
costs of expression by requiring speakers to take out insurance
policies or to pay for police protection. In 1992 the Supreme Court
intimated that it might sustain such regulations if the regulations

49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 49 (D.D.C.
1993), vacatedand remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
52. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469-70.

53. Id. at 2469-72.
54. Id. at 2470.
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were enacted and applied in a content-neutral way. 55 Additionally,
content-neutral regulations can closely control, and severely
curtail, the numbers of speakers and the locations and times where
speech may occur, to the point where the speech is so muted as to
be ineffective. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme
Court professedly subjected all such regulations to intermediate
scrutiny, but in practice applied only cursory review, and in
particular sustained regulations that were almost grotesquely overinclusive or under-inclusive, or which rested upon wholly
speculative, that is to say undocumented concerns. 56 Turner sends
out a very clear message to municipalities across the nation:
henceforward, in order to justify time, place, and manner
regulations, even content-neutral ones, of speech in a public forum,
you are going to have to come up with something better than that.
V. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
I want to say a few words about the individual Justices. But
before I do, let me turn to the Kiryas Establishment Clause
decision. First, the $64,000 question: in the aftermath of Kiryas,
what is the status of the, for some, infamous Lemon 57 test: the test
that the United States Supreme Court has used virtually as a test
for all seasons in Establishment Clause cases since 1971 ?
Many of you are familiar with this test, which inquires whether
there is an exclusively religious purpose, whether there is a
primary effect that advances or inhibits religion, and whether there
is excessive church-state entanglement. 5 8 Many of you also know
that the test has been challenged or at least questioned by a number

55. Forsyth County, Ga. v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395,
2405 (1992) ("[T]he provision of the Forsyth County ordinance relating to fees
is invalid because it unconstitutionally ties the amount of the fee to the content
of the speech and lacks adequate procedural safeguards; no limit on such a fee
can remedy these constitutional violations.").
56. See cases cited supra note 24.
57. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
58. Id. at 612-13.
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of Justices, including five who are presently sitting. 59 What did
Kiryas do with the test: preserve it or repudiate it?
Well, Justice Souter wrote the Court's opinion and it was a
majority opinion. Five Justices joined it. And it did not repudiate
Lemon. So, Lemon lives, right? Lemon is alive and well. But
maybe not. Some of you have probably read the famous exchange
between Sherlock Holmes and Inspector Gregory, in the story
Silver Blaze.60 "I draw your attention," said Holmes, "to the
curious incident of the dog in the night-time." "The dog did
nothing in the night-time," replied Gregory. "That," said Holmes,
"was the curious incident." 6 1
Well, Justice Souter did nothing with the Lemon test. He did not
repudiate it, but neither did he use it. Indeed, to the best of my
recollection, he did not even so much as mention it. Instead, he
found the government's action unconstitutional primarily because
it created an unacceptable and potentially unreviewable risk that
the government might, in the future, deny similar accommodations
62
to other similarly situated religious groups.
Justice Blackmun, who joined Justice Souter's majority opinion,
wrote separately to express his understanding that the opinion did
not undermine Lemon. 63 But of course Justice Blackmun was
speaking only for himself; and of course Justice Blackmun is no
longer on the Court.
Justice O'Connor, who also joined most of the majority opinion,
at least all of the parts that are relevant to this discussion, likewise
wrote separately to express her understanding of what that opinion
said. According to her, it does repudiate Lemon as a test for all
seasons. 64 What she wrote was especially interesting to me,
59. The five include Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2149-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. See Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 335 (1930).
61. Id. at 347.
62. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2491-92 (1994).
63. Id. at 2494-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 2498-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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because it struck a familiar note. Justice O'Connor did not deny
that the Lemon test may still be useful in certain limited
circumstances. But Lemon is not, she said, a test for all seasons.
Establishment Clause issues, she explained, are simply too
variegated and too complex to lend themselves to resolution by the
65
facile application of a single standard.
Why do I find this interesting? Because her view of the Lemon
test replicates the history of the clear and present danger doctrine
under the speech clause in the 1940s and 1950s. Many people
believed, in those days, that the clear and present danger test was a
test for all seasons when dealing with speech issues. 66 But then, of
course, in the 'sixties, 'seventies, and 'eighties we began to learn
that, once again, the issues were simply too variegated and too
complex to lend themselves to resolution through the facile
application of a single test. And today clear and present danger is
just one test of many that the Court uses in speech cases,
depending on the circumstances, even when government decisionmaking is content-based. 67 Perhaps the Lemon test is going the
68
same way.
65. Id at 2499 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
66. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 514-15 (1951). "Ve hold
that the statute may be applied where there is a 'clear and present danger' of the
substantive evil which the legislature had the right to prevent." Id. at 515;
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941) ("What finally emerges from
the 'clear and present danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive
evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished.").
67. Differently put, "clear and present danger," today, may be only one
example of a compelling government interest under the strict scrutiny test for
content-based regulations. E.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1851
(1992) ("[A] State has a compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion
and undue influence."); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) ("We must
therefore subject the State's asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic
character of the flag to 'the most exacting scrutiny."' (quoting Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988))). And of course there are different tests altogether for
laws that target certain discrete speech categories. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
In commercial speech cases ... a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the
First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision,
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Ultimately, however, what is important is that, regardless of
whether and in what form the Lemon test survives, there is not
likely to be much change in Establishment Clause outcomes.
Justice Kennedy dislikes Lemon, but he wrote the Court's opinion
in Lee v. Weisman69 two years ago, invalidating graduation prayer.
And he concurred, albeit on narrow grounds, in Kiryas.70 He is
certainly not insensitive to church-state separation issues. Justice
O'Connor does not like Lemon either, but she concurred in the

it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
The basic guidelines [in obscenity cases] ... must be: (a) whether 'the
average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the pnrient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
Id. (citation omitted); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971) ("Any prior restraint on expression comes to this court with a 'heavy
presumption' against its constitutional validity. [One] ... carries a heavy burden

of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.") (citations
omitted); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 (1969).
The inquiry in every [picketing and parading] case must be ... whether
control of the use of the streets for a parade or procession was, in fact,
'exerted so.as not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly
and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the
discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to
public places.'
Id. (quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)).
68. A more particularized treatment of Establishment Clause issues would
be consistent, for better or for worse, with the Supreme Court's ongoing efforts
to harmonize its approaches to the First Amendment's various clauses. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (harmonizing the Free
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479
(1985) (harmonizing the Petition Clause and the Free Speech Clause).
69. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
70. Kiryas, 114 S. Ct. at 2500-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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graduation prayer decision 71 and she also concurred in Kiryas.
She, too, is sensitive to separation issues and does not want any
significant changes in results.
The only Justices who want to see significant changes in
outcomes are Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist.7 2 And that
adds up to three. As to the others, there may be a few changes in
outcomes, but these will amount to small yardage. For instance and this may be of interest to the municipal lawyers in the audience
- five of the nine Kiryas Justices made it clear that they would
like to overrule two 1985 decisions: Aguilar v. Felton7 3 and Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball.74 Both of these decisions held,
albeit for different reasons, that public school teachers could not
render secular instruction on parochial school premises during or
75
after the regular school day. In Kiryas, Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, Thomas, Kennedy 76 and O'Connor7 7 all made it clear
that they would like to see both decisions overturned, but in
literally and
Establishment Clause terms, this would be figuratively -

small change.

Most importantly of all, to me, five of Kiryas' nine Justices,
including O'Connor, very definitely including O'Connor,
reiterated that, in their view, the Establishment Clause does not
merely prevent government from favoring one religious sect above
others. It also prohibits government from favoring religion over
78
irreligion: that is to say, from favoring all religions over none.
True, one of those five, Justice Blackmun, is gone. But I do not
think that my law school classmate, Justice Breyer, from what I
remember of him, is likely to upset that balance.

71. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring).
72. See Kiryas, 114 S. Ct. at 2505-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
74. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
75. Kiryas, 114 S. Ct. at 2505-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id.at 2500-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 2495-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2491-92. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Ginsburg,
all joined Justice Souter, the author, in this portion of the opinion.
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VI. THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
Finally, let me turn to the opinions of the individual Justices. The
two I find most fascinating are Justices Souter and Kennedy.
Justice Souter was a stealth candidate all right, but not in the way
that his detractors had supposed. This is the man who, together
with Justice Kennedy, has written most eloquently about the
dangers that private sector wealth and power imbalances pose to
the effective exercise of speech rights. I am thinking not so much
of anything they have written this past Term; rather I am thinking
79
of their separate opinions in Krishna Consciousness.

Also fascinating to me is another Justice whom I much admire,
Justice O'Connor. She has made two principal points.
First, she has expressed and very well articulated her suspicion
of all categorical rules. She did so not only in Kiryas; she also did
it in Waters, where she wrote the plurality opinion, 80 and again in
Ladue, where she wrote separately for that very reason. 8 1
I also believe that Justice O'Connor is beginning to show some
concern for the impacts of those private sector wealth and power
disparities on the effective exercise of speech rights. Some
glimmerings of these concerns came through in the airport speech
case, Krishna Consciousness,where she cast a dispositive vote that
gave the speakers in that case at least a partial victory. 82 She also
said it very explicitly in Turner, where she wrote, in a separate
opinion, that she both recognized and feared the dangers to speech
of private sector power concentrations. 83 True, she added that the
First Amendment is only concerned with dangers arising from
79. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701,

2715-20 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2724-27 (Souter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

80. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1885-86 (1994).
81. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2048 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
82. Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. at 2711-15 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
83. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2480 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She was joined by
Justice Ginsburg and, interestingly, by Justices Scalia and Thomas.
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government power, but she qualified that remark by observing, and
I deem her choice of words significant, that this is the thrust of the
First Amendment "as we understand it today."84 For both reasons,
her distrust of categorical rules, and her growing concerns about
the impact of private sector wealth disparities on speech freedom, I
suspect that she may be ready to reconsider her views on current
First Amendment public forum theory. So far she has sided with
that barebones majority which, through a categorical test, has
allowed state and local governments to place most government
property off-limits to speakers. Reading between the lines, I think
she may be reconsidering her position on forum-analysis issues.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of Justice O'Connor's position, I believe that current
public forum analysis, which has never commanded more than a
barebones majority, is doomed. It is doomed by Justice White's
departure, and his replacement by Justice Ginsburg. Or at least it is
doomed, whatever Justice O'Connor does, if, as I suspect, Justice
Breyer aligns himself on that question with Justice Ginsburg, and
with Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter, who have never left
any doubt as to where they stand. I think, therefore, that we are
going to see within a very few years a much more permissive and
fact-specific test for speech access to government property: one
whereby all government property, open to the public, is
presumptively open to speech uses unless the government can
prove, in each instance, that the speech would prevent the
government agency that owns the property from carrying on its
85
normal functions.

84. Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added).

85. This was the access test that the Supreme Court formerly used. See
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In recent times, however,
Grayned's generous, fact-bound test has been displaced by a more stinting,
categorical model, beginning with Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), and extending through International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992).
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Incidentally, I have a case right now before the Connecticut
Supreme Court which urges that Court to use our state constitution
to impose that test. 86 But if my crystal ball is correct as to where
the United States Supreme Court is headed, in a few years it will
not much matter what our state court does.
Let me conclude pretty much as I began. I said there were six
cases: five speech, one Establishment Clause. There is an amazing
thing about all those six cases, and I think it has been some time
since this has happened. In three of them, Ibanez, Ladue, and
Kiryas, you had a clear victory for the First Amendment. And in
the other three you had, at worst, mixed results. Indeed, in two of
the three, Turner and Waters, the results on balance favored the
First Amendment, that is, favored the speaker, the challenger. In
none of the six did the First Amendment take a beating. We are in
good hands. As they say, God save the Honorable Court, and
thanks for listening to me.
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Are there any questions?
Audience Member:
Professor Margulies, how do you square the flag burning case 87
with the downgrading of speech protection that you ascribe to the
Court's majority?
ProfessorMartin B. Margulies:
Whose property was that flag? The majority opinion emphasized
that, for all the record revealed, the flag was the speaker's property
or was given to the speaker by the person to whom it belongs. 88
Certainly that case neither acknowledged nor implied any right to
use a government-owned flag for speech purposes. And second,
Justice Scalia, who cast the deciding vote, is - to his credit
86. State v. Linares, No. SC 14861 (Conn. filed Nov. 4, 1993).
87. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

88. Id. at 399.
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exquisitely sensitive to anything that smacks of intentional
departure, by government, from the viewpoint-neutrality principle.
What he does not seem to recognize, to my deep regret, is that even
seemingly neutral rules can have a terribly disparate impact upon
speakers who stand economically and politically outside the
mainstream.
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